Egyptian president mubarak supported american & british plan for saddam regime fall : desclassified information

Defence affairs - Amer sultan Memo

Newly declassified British documents reveal that the late Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak supported US and British efforts to defeat and humiliate Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, predicting that a military defeat would lead to the Iraqi leader’s downfall.

The documents, released by the British National Archives, show that Mubarak advised British Prime Minister John Major to disregard Arab public opinion and press forward with the military campaign. He argued that once Iraq was militarily defeated, Saddam would be removed by his own generals.

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, triggering international condemnation. On 17 January 1991, a US-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm to liberate the country.

Mubarak’s advice came about three weeks into the military campaign.

During a phone call, Major explored the possibility of a sudden Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and voiced concern that Saddam might claim symbolic victory simply by having “stood up” to the US. Major stressed that both the US and UK “very much” wanted to avoid such an outcome, insisting Saddam had to be not just defeated but humiliated. He added that destroying Iraq’s military capabilities was “important”.

Mubarak agreed, predicting that once defeated, Saddam would “soon be seen off” by his generals. He stressed the importance of applying maximum pressure on the Iraqi Republican Guard. Even if Saddam withdrew, Mubarak told Major, the destruction of his military capabilities would ensure he “would not survive”. He reiterated that military defeat would bring down Saddam’s regime.

Following the start of the coalition’s air campaign, Iraq launched missile strikes on Israel, which, along with the US-led war operation, sparked pro-Iraq demonstrations in several Arab countries. These protests caused concern in both Washington and London.

When asked about the state of Arab public opinion, Mubarak advised Major “not to pay too much attention” to it. Regarding Egypt, Mubarak claimed he had full backing from the whole Egyptians, the People’s Assembly (parliament), and various national institutions.

During the call, Major praised Mubarak for his strong stance, saying British officials were “tremendously impressed” with his “clear-cut and outspoken lead on Gulf issues,” which had earned him “great admiration” in the UK. Mubarak, in turn, described the conflict with Iraq as a “matter of principle” for Egypt, insisting that Egypt’s commitment “would not weaken”.

According to other documents unearthed by MEMO, Mubarak informed the UK that Saddam had tried to “bribe” him into supporting Iraq’s stance against Kuwait.

Prior to Mubarak’s call, US Vice President Dan Quayle met Major in London and expressed concern that Muslim public opinion was becoming “steadily more vocal” in support of Saddam—not just in the Middle East but also in the Far East. He called it a “worrying development.”

Asked whether the British public supported Saddam’s removal as a war aim, Major said such an objective “couldn’t be an overt aim.” Quayle, however, noted growing feeling in the U.S. that Saddam must be removed, but acknowledged that the US and UK had to consider the possibility that Saddam could survive the war and remain politically powerful, with much of his military power intact.