UAE vs Saudi Arabia , somaliland brief history and israeli chess move

Defence affairs - Def-Geopolitics

The historic diplomatic move ties a long-unrecognized democracy to a volatile regional chessboard, illuminating Somaliland’s quest for sovereignty, the Red Sea shipping crisis and growing tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in southern Yemen.

Alongside plans to establish diplomatic ties and civilian-economic cooperation, the move carries significant strategic weight. Somaliland is located opposite Yemen, at the maritime junction of the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea—precisely the area where Yemen’s Houthi movement has been targeting international shipping lanes over the past two years.

He claimed Israel seeks “to turn Somaliland into a base for hostile operations against Somalia, African states, Yemen and Arab countries, thereby endangering the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.”

Israel’s recognition of the territory—which broke away from Somalia in 1991—comes amid mounting tensions in southern Yemen, where secessionist forces backed by the United Arab Emirates are making gains. That development has placed the UAE in direct contention with Saudi Arabia over control of one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors.

Somaliland sits in northwestern historic Somalia, stretching along hundreds of miles of coastline on the Gulf of Aden, directly across from Yemen. The region is a critical maritime route leading to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic chokepoint through which a significant portion of trade between Asia and Europe passes en route to the Suez Canal. 

Since Houthi attacks on shipping intensified following Hamas’ October 7 assault on Israel and the war that followed, many shipping companies have rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope at a steep financial cost felt in part by Israeli consumers.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is far more than an unusual diplomatic gesture. It links an unrecognized democracy in the Horn of Africa with Yemen’s internal power struggles, Saudi-Emirati rivalry over regional influence, and the Houthi threat to global trade. For Somaliland, it marks a historic breakthrough; for Israel, it is a calculated gamble in a volatile arena—one that could expand its strategic reach but also draw it deeper into one of the world’s most fragile fault lines.

diplomatic ties and an Emirati base

Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland remains legally and internationally recognized as an autonomous region within Somalia. Only three entities have formally acknowledged Somaliland’s sovereignty: Taiwan, which is not a United Nations member and whose own recognition is limited; Israel, the first UN member state to do so; and Ethiopia, which has pledged eventual recognition but has yet to follow through, though it maintains trade and diplomatic ties with the territory.

Despite lacking official recognition, Somaliland has for years maintained an informal web of international relationships, including with Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates. It hosts foreign delegations and maintains diplomatic missions, but without embassies or full legal recognition.

Despite lacking official recognition, Somaliland has for years maintained an informal web of international relationships, including with Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates. It hosts foreign delegations and maintains diplomatic missions, but without embassies or full legal recognition.

The most prominent of these ties is with the UAE, centered on the Port of Berbera along the Gulf of Aden. The Dubai-based firm DP World has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to transform the port into a regional trade hub, serving, among other purposes, as a logistics corridor for landlocked Ethiopia. The UAE also operates a military base at the site, approved by Somaliland’s parliament in 2017.

Tensions in southern Yemen and the Saudi-UAE rift

Coinciding with Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates, have advanced in Yemen’s Hadramawt and al-Mahrah governorates—sensitive, resource-rich regions near the Omani border. These areas are also of strategic interest to Saudi Arabia, which has sought in recent years to reduce its military involvement in Yemen.

The developments underscore growing friction between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, once partners in the anti-Houthi coalition, over control of key maritime points along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Somaliland lies along the same strategic axis, where the UAE has already established a significant presence through ports and infrastructure investments. While Riyadh has moved toward a negotiated settlement with the Houthis and stabilization of its southern border, the UAE has pursued a different strategy: expanding its influence in southern Yemen, especially along coastal zones, ports and key maritime passages.

The STC is the leading force behind these moves. Founded in 2017, it is a secessionist body advocating the re-establishment of an independent South Yemen, as existed before unification in 1990. The council is politically, economically and militarily backed by the UAE, and effectively controls the city of Aden and wide swaths of the south. It is a rival to Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which continues to receive formal backing from Saudi Arabia.

In recent weeks, the STC has pushed further east into Hadramawt and al-Mahrah—territories not traditionally within its core areas of control. These are far more than peripheral regions: Hadramawt is Yemen’s largest governorate, rich in oil and gas, and home to a major seaport. Control over it offers economic depth and broader operational freedom. Al-Mahrah, adjacent to the Omani border and near Saudi territory, has long been linked to Saudi strategic interests, including past efforts to build an oil pipeline to the Arabian Sea that would bypass both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

From Riyadh’s perspective, the rise of a pro-UAE force in these regions represents a dual threat—undermining Saudi influence in Yemen and jeopardizing long-term strategic plans. Despite their shared opposition to the Houthis, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deepened in recent years. Saudi Arabia has prioritized border stability and political settlement, even at the cost of concessions, while the UAE has focused on gaining control of key nodes: ports, islands, maritime chokepoints and trade routes. Recent reports of Saudi air warning strikes on STC-aligned forces have revealed that the rivalry is not merely diplomatic but also military, albeit still restrained.

Where does Israel’s recognition of Somaliland fit into this picture? While not a direct participant in the Yemeni conflict, Israel’s move dovetails with broader regional dynamics. It faces both direct and indirect threats from the Houthis to freedom of navigation, and the UAE—an Abraham Accords partner since 2020—remains a key regional ally. Somaliland offers a civilian-strategic vantage point on the Yemeni theater without drawing Israel directly into its quagmire.

Southern Yemen, once a peripheral theater, has thus become a flashpoint in the contest between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the future of post-war Yemen—and potentially over the regional order at large. Somaliland, for its part, sits at the intersection of this contest, global trade routes, the Houthi threat and Israeli interests. While Israel’s move did not create this dynamic, it fits squarely within it, underscoring how the Horn of Africa, southern Yemen and the Red Sea now form a single, interconnected arena where every diplomatic act is also a geo-strategic calculation.